

THE
137
HYPOTHESIS

OF

G. A. K.

A Tri-une Subsistence in the Deity,

As maintained by

THE AUTHOR OF A SEASONABLE REBUKE
TO AN IGNORANT REVILER,

Examined by a BY-STANDER,

IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND.

Audendum est ut illustrata veritas pateat, multique ab errore
liberentur.

Lact. Instit. Div. Lib. 4. c. 5.

Egregie Aristoteles ait, nunquam nos verecundiores esse debere,
quam cum de Diis agitur, quanto magis cum de Deorum na-
tura disputamus, nequid temere, nequid impudenter, aut ig-
norantes affirmemus, aut scientes mentiamur.

Sen. Nat. Quæst. Lib. 7. cap. 30.

LONDON, Printed for J. Wilkie in St. Paul's Church-yard,

THE
HYPOTHESIS

OF

A True Substance in the Deity

The Author
to an Ignorant Reviewer.



Examined by a BYSTANDER.

LETTER to a FRIEND.

London: Printed by J. WILKINS, in St. Paul's Church-yard.

1790. 8s. 6d.

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T O

The Revd. Mr John Westly,

The Revd. Mr George Whitfield,

And all their adherents,

Is this short epistle earnestly recommended,

by their sincere friend and well-wisher,

A By-stander.

T O

The Revd. Mr John Wesley

The Revd. Mr George Whitfield

And all their adherents,

Is this short epistle earnestly recommended,

by their friends and well-wishers,

A By-stander.

P R E F A C E
T H E
P R E F A C E
T O

The *R E A D E R*.

THE Author of The seasonable re-
buke to an ignorant Reviler; or,
The Blacksmith refuted, begins
his notable performance with acquainting
the public, That he takes up the pen, not
so much in defence of his absent friends,
(one of whom was in Bristol at the time
of his writing), as of the truth. I must
beg the same indulgence of the reader,
while I do justice to the character of a
Gentleman, who has been unhand-
somely treated by this as mean, as unequal ad-
versary, in his pretended Refutation of enthu-
siasm delineated; which, in my humble o-
pinion, is a performance, that will be ever
unanswered: And I take this opportunity
of

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of publickly thanking its honest and ingenuous Author, for the eminent service he has done Christianity, and the Protestant cause. I have had a perfect knowledge of him from his infancy, and positively affirm, that he is in every respect exactly the reverse of what this contemptible scribler has drawn him. It is somewhat strange, that a person of the Blacksmith's public character should lie under such a charge, and yet his neighbours and acquaintances, who see him daily, be entirely ignorant of it, till this fellow, who knows neither his face, nor his name, can furnish the world with an account of the matter, though till very lately was never nearer to the Blacksmith than 500 miles. I who know him very well, do in *verbo sacerdotis* declare, That he is a man who has all the good qualities that can meet together, to recommend him. He is possessed of all the parts of learning that are valuable in a clergyman, in a degree this petulant Reprover is utterly incapable of possessing any single one. He has joined to a good skill in the three learned languages, a great compass of the
best

P R E F A C E.

best philosophy; and his writings are a proof of his piety. And to all this learning, and the good use he has made of it, is added a temper happy beyond expression: A sweet, easy, modest, inoffensive, obliging behaviour adorn all his actions; and no passion, vanity, insolence or ostentation, appear, either in what he writes or says: And yet these faults are often incident to the best men in the freedom of conversation, and in writing against impertinent and unreasonable adversaries, especially such as (like this Reprover) strike at the foundation of virtue and religion. This is the learning, this the temper of the Blacksmith, who, because he has made a very laudable attempt to rescue Christianity from the power of enthusiasm, must be blackened and defamed; must be base-ly worried out of the great and clear reputation he has all his life-time been possessed of, by men who have never read any of his writings, and if they did could not understand them: And he that has so many shining qualities must be insulted by every worthless wretch, as if he had as little learn-

P R E F A C E.

learning and virtue, as the lowest of them
that are against, even as this Reprover,
who by the specimen he has given the
world of his learning and good manners e-
vidently proves him to have been *trivius*
conceptus et educatus stercore.

Thus much the love of truth obliges me
publicly to testify in favour of a candid and
ingenuous adversary, he being a member of
the established church in this kingdom, and
a minister of the church of Scotland.

A. G.
Bath, October, 1764.

A L E T.

LETTER to a FRIEND.

SIR,

AS the desire of a friend has always with me the force of a command, I shall endeavour in the best manner I am able, to give you satisfaction in relation to the pamphlet now under consideration, intituled; A seasonable rebuke to an ignorant reviler; or, The blacksmith refuted. It is in my opinion at first sight apparent, the difference between the two writers lies precisely in this, that the one has clear and just notions of his subject, the other seems to be at a loss what to say, and betrays the most profound ignorance of what he had undertaken to write upon. A very noble and equal match this. The success has been as equal; truth against falsehood, learning against ignorance, fame against infamy. The Blacksmith had maintained That faith, belief, or the rational assent of the mind, could in no case go beyond the perception of the understanding; and that to believe a thing without knowing what we believe, or without having any certain fixed ideas to the terms of the proposition assented to, must be impossible and contradictory. Now this plainly affected those who set up for the belief of what they cannot explain or render intelligible; and who, after they have been so often and so closely pressed to it, are not able to assign any determinate idea to their own

words. The Reprover very kindly undertakes the cause of these mysterious believers, and gives us an instance of a proposition which he understands not, and, which he at the same time believes, namely, the doctrine of the Trinity, who, as he says, are three in person, and but one in essence. This, he says, he believes upon the testimony of revelation.

The Reprover is wonderfully happy in the clearing of difficulties, and if he could have made good what he here has asserted, he would have decided this controversy at once; and we might all from henceforth have agreed, at least in words, whether we meant the same thing or not. But I am afraid, Sir, that the Reprover's zeal has in this case been very prejudicial to his memory. Where, I would ask him, does the Holy Scripture assert this, that they are three in person, and but one in essence? Others indeed, before him, have pretended to draw this as a consequence, and have accordingly set it up as their own inference and deduction from scripture; but that it should be scripture itself, or a scripture expression, was never, I suppose, known or heard of till now. If this Reprover has found out any such assertion, in any hitherto unknown copy or manuscript of the New Testament, I hope, he will no longer conceal so very material and remarkable a discovery; or, if he has been favoured with a particular revelation from heaven, in relation to this matter, he will be kind enough to communicate
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what the Lord hath spoken to his servant : but if, as I am positive, he can produce no such evidence, or revelation, he, in my humble opinion, has here discovered something which he had much better have concealed. One would think that self existence and original existence, begotten and unbegotten, should be an essential difference, and that the same numerical essence cannot be original and unoriginal, self-existent and derived ; but this, perhaps, the Reprover will allow to be above reason, and therefore it may be as impossible, as if it were contrary to reason.

The pains which this Reprover and such sort of writers are at to perplex, obscure, and render unintelligible the very first principles of all religion, concerning the notion and belief of one God, and the uncharitable zeal they discover in hereticating all those who have too much good sense to fall in with their dark inexplicable schemes, is what cannot (and indeed ought not) to be looked upon without an equal degree of horror, indignation, and contempt.

The unity of God had been ever thought a principle very plain and intelligible, and obvious enough to the common sense of mankind, till certain refiners upon St. Paul and the scriptures took it into a system of school-divinity ; and then the Christian doctrines, by the help of Pagan metaphysics, were thrown all into darkness and confusion. They found they had a profitable trade, and gained much in lessening the number
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of candidates for church preferments, by turning the articles of faith into unintelligible, inexplicable mysteries, which they themselves could neither understand nor explain. In short, he was thought the best Christian, who understood the least of his own faith; and it came at length to be looked upon as a point of merit in a man, strenuously to maintain, that the Christian revelation is no revelation at all, or that it reveals things which cannot possibly be revealed, because they are incomprehensible to human understandings.

Of this number is this sublime believer, this mysterious Reprover, who lays down (as I understand him) an uncontested principle, namely, That God may reveal some things, the nature, reasons, circumstances, and modes of which cannot be brought down to the level of our weak understandings. He means, I suppose, that a thing in itself may be revealed, as to its truth and existence, though the manner, reasons and other circumstances of the thing are not revealed, and so still remain as to us incomprehensible. This is all that can possibly be meant by it; for should it be said, that the modes, reasons, &c. are revealed or made known to us, and yet that they still remain incomprehensible or unknown notwithstanding the revelation, it would be a contradiction in terms. But here I must not dissemble a plain truth, which is, that this insolent Reprover immediately contradicts himself. The Blacksmith had asserted, page 16. That
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those things that are above reason as depending wholly upon revelation, must, by the revelation itself, be brought down to our understandings and capacities, so as to enable us to form some clear and consistent notions and conceptions about them. Now, in answer to this, the Reprover, page 19. says, There are many things revealed that we cannot form clear and consistent notions of, yet it is far from absurd in us to give our assent to them on testimony, especially the testimony of him who cannot be deceived himself, or deceive others. A thing in itself, as to its truth and existence in general, may be certainly revealed, and made clear and intelligible enough where the unrevealed manner and other circumstances of the thing may remain still unknown and incomprehensible: in which case we ought to receive and believe the thing so far as it is revealed, and content ourselves in being ignorant in other matters, where God has not thought fit to inform us. And who ever doubted of this, or once denied it? And therefore the Reprover's urging it as a matter of great consequence, and as what the Blacksmith would not grant, is somewhat extraordinary, and a glaring instance of his Christian tenderness, moderation, and charity. If he cannot find a man, who owning a thing to be revealed from God, will yet not believe it, because he cannot understand the reason or manner of the thing, let him bear the imputation which he now lays upon the Blacksmith, without the least

least appearance, I will not say of Christian charity, but even of Pagan justice : It being evident to all men, that morality is no part of the Reprover's religion. Let him prove the thing in dispute, that there are three distinct intelligent agents in the one God, and I shall receive it ; but he must know very well that it is the thing itself, and not the manner of the thing, which he affirms, and his adversary denies, to be a matter of divine revelation ; and tho' he pretends to throw off all his ignorance and inconsistency upon the unrevelled and unknown causes, reasons and modes of things, yet I hope to demonstrate, that his ignorance lies in his having no notion of the very thing he writes about. In order to which, I beg leave to observe to you, that there is one general contradiction inclusive of all particular contradictions, and to which they are all reducible, namely, That the same thing, at the same time, may be, and not be ; or, that the same proposition may be true and false, at the same time. Now, could the Reprover get but over this, he might very safely undertake transubstantiation itself. Now this complication of all absurdities, the Reprover with all his mysterious believers assume as their first principle ; which they employ as the great engine, to remove all other difficulties, and extricate themselves from the troublesome weight whenever they are taken, as is very often the case, in affirming and denying the same thing. Their principle is this, that the same thing
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may be, and not be ; or the same proposition may be true and false ; not indeed in the same, but in different respects. Now, Sir, be but kind enough to grant the Reprover this single principle, and I will defy you or any man living ever to be able to fasten a contradiction upon him ; because it will evidently follow from the principle itself, that there can be no such thing in nature as a contradiction, but every thing is equally true and false at the same time. I think it therefore, incumbent upon me to prove, that this distinction of the same and different respects is merely imaginary and verbal, that the same thing, at the same time, should be true and false in any sense at all, either in the same or in different respects. Every man living must allow, that every affirmation or negation, in a proposition, asserted, or denied, in any one particular determinate sense, must necessarily, in that determinate sense, be either true or false ; and cannot be both or neither, for this plain and obvious reason, because in a particular determinate sense there can be no variety ; and there is, and can be no medium between truth and falsehood. It is also manifest, that the thing we affirm or deny, cannot be the same thing any longer than the terms of the proposition retain the same precise determinate meaning ; for where the complex ideas to which the terms of the proposition are affixed, shall be any way altered or varied, either by putting in some new ideas, or by leaving out any of the old,

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though the same sound may be retained, yet the thing itself, which is hereby affirmed or denied, will by no means be the same, but quite different things: even as different as an egg is from an elephant, or a musket bullet from a pike. What is therefore often, if to serve a particular exigency, called one same thing in different respects, is really, in fact, two very different things, one of which may be easily true, while at the same time the other may, is, and necessarily must be, contradictory and false. And this, Sir, is really the great mystery of different senses and respects, being merely a contrivance of subtle disputants, when they are determined to shuffle upon you very different and perhaps contradictory things, under the same sound, as one and the same thing.

I shall now apply this method of reasoning to the Reprover's Tri-une subsistence of the God-head; and shew that it expressly implies an impossibility and contradiction in the abstract nature and reason of things; and that if the Reprover will be so consistent with himself, as to stand to his principles, he must found his hope of salvation upon a necessary and eternal contradiction, and profess himself a Mono-tritheist. But passing preliminaries, let us come to the argument.

To say, that there are three things really distinct and different, so that the one is not the other; that each of these three distinct and different things are infinite, and yet that there are not three different things:

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which are infinite, or three infinites, but only one infinite, or one thing only that is infinite, this I positively affirm, is an express contradiction in the nature of things. Thus also, to affirm, that there are three really distinct and different subjects, which are each of them indued with power, wisdom, and intelligence; and yet, that there are not three infinite powers, wisdoms, or intelligences, or three infinitely powerful, wise and intelligent subjects, but only one such is manifestly contradictory and impossible in the nature and reason of things. For the distinctness and infinity of the same specific attributes, must necessarily be multiplied with their distinct infinite subjects; and the negation of this must be eternally a contradiction, while the same precise meaning is affixed to the same terms. And mentally to change the sense of the terms by clapping a different meaning to the same sound, under a pretence of the same thing in different respects, when at the same time, it is really two very different things; this, I say, is not to clear a contradiction, but to use a villainous piece of artifice, and impose upon the reason and senses of mankind.

Permit me, Sir, to carry this somewhat farther. It is, you know, universally allowed by all the Athanasians, that the Father, the Son, and Spirit, are three distinct and different subjects; and so far distinct, that they are each of them indued with really distinct and incommunicable attributes, or properties. They like-

wise affirm, that each of these distinct and different subjects, is God in the strictest sense, or God absolutely, supreme over all; and yet they maintain, that there is but one only subject that is God alone; that is, say they, that there are three who are each of them distinctly God, and yet there is but one who is God alone. Now, Sir, the foregoing doctrine when reduced to the form of a proposition, plainly amounts to this, There is but one God: The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God; therefore these three are one God. If the Reprover uses the word God precisely in the same sense as applied to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost; if he has not one distinct determinate idea, when he uses these different sounds, as I imagine he cannot, his argument must stand thus: There is but one God. But God is God, God is God, and God is God. Therefore God is one God. If he can shew that I have misrepresented him in this way of setting forth his argument, and that there is one single idea in his account that is not in mine, and in the very same order; I say, if he can prove this, I doubt not but he will think himself obliged to do it in justification of his so clear and accurate reasoning.

Now, though the contradiction here be abundantly evident in itself, yet it may be proper to consider the general evasion by which they endeavour to get off with it; and it is this: They say, that the three distinct

distinct subjects of the personal properties are united in one common subject of the essential properties, and so are one and the same in substance or essence. But here they labour to get rid of one contradiction, by running at least into twenty more; for either this one common subject of the essential attributes, is precisely and determinately the very self same with the three distinct subjects of the personal attributes, or it is not. If they affirm that it is, this will be saying, That one subject is three distinct subjects, and three distinct subjects but one subject, without distinction or diversity; and this at the same time and in the same sense: which, I presume, every one must allow to be an express contradiction. But if it be said, That the common subject of the essential properties, is not the self-same but a distinct subject from the three other distinct subjects of the personal properties; then since also the essential attributes are supposed to be communicated to the three distinct subjects of the personal attributes, this must necessarily make four distinct subjects, each of which is indued with all the essential attributes; that is, four distinct infinitely perfect substances. It is true, these infinite substances will be undividedly and inseparably united to each other mutually, since it is impossible that three infinitely extended substances should be divided or separated with respect to space or dimension; but then this does not destroy the real existence, and numerical distinctions, of the substances themselves. If

to avoid this multiplicity of substances, it is said, That the substances that sustain the personal attributes, are not numerically distinct, but one and the same with the common essence; as this destroys all manner of distinction betwixt essential and personal attributes, and supposes a person to be only a distinct mode of subsistence in the one common subject or substance; which is Sabellianism: So by confounding the distinct subjects, and supposing them to be numerically one and the same, it contains a most palpable contradiction, and effectually overthrows the Reprover's hypothesis of a Tri-une Subsistence. And, indeed, Sir, consider this scheme in what light soever you please, you will find it replete with absurdities, and must therefore necessarily destroy itself. There is one evasion still behind, as the dernier resort of those, who in this scheme are pressed with contradictions; that is, when they cannot get themselves off by any possible sense that can be put to their own words, they fly to the incomprehensibility of the subject, which, as they seem to think, gives them a right to use words without a meaning. And thus, at length, they stand acquitted in empty sounds and impenetrable darkness, for who can charge a proposition with a contradiction, which is on all hands owned to be unintelligible, and to have no determinate sense or meaning at all.

And now, Sir, having demonstrated the impossibility and self-contradictoriness of the Reprover's hypothesis

thesis of a tri-une subsistence; let us enquire what must be his faith in this great article; you will give me leave, Sir, to retort the accusation he with so little truth and decency urges against the Blacksmith, upon himself; for in his own words, p. 19. I am persuaded he has made a rash attempt to bring the power of religion into disrepute, by taking the side of those great enemies of the truth, Socinus and his deluded followers. If he is not a Socinian, it will be impossible for any man to say what he is; for I shall shew that his verbal orthodoxy differs nothing from real heresy.

In order to shew how far, and wherein he differs from a Socinian, I shall consider in what particulars they must necessarily be agreed, and then leave it to the learned Reprover himself to express (if he can) the difference.

He must, I suppose, agree with the Socinians in those following particulars.

First, That there has existed, from all eternity, by an absolute intrinsic necessity of nature, one only supreme independent first cause of all things; one individual intelligent being of absolute infinite perfection; or one God. This is the first principle of natural religion, demonstrable a priori from the nature and reason of things: and in this, Christians, Jews, and Mahometans are all agreed. This is the only true notion that men have, or can have of the Supreme Being. And Christianity does not set up a different object of worship

worship, from that which always was the true object of all religious worship, and supreme adoration to mankind under the light and law of nature. What the scripture does in this case, is, first, To restore the knowledge and worship of the one true God, by setting his being and perfections in a clearer light, and confirming this account of him by miracles, after the true knowledge of God, as revealed by nature, had been lost, and men, thro' the general depravity of human nature, had sunk into idolatry and polytheism. The scripture reveals also to us the true and acceptable manner of worshipping the one true God, through the alone mediation of his only begotten Son, whom the scripture requires us to receive and own as the Son of God, the one mediator between God and man; and that we honour, worship, and glorify him in this capacity of mediator, as the person appointed by God the father to govern and judge the world. But this neither supposes or implies the smallest alteration or difference in the nature, notion, or idea of the one supreme being, the supreme and ultimate object of religious worship and adoration. So that this principle stands now as it stood before in the nature and reason of things; and is not altered, but cleared, restored, and set in a stronger light. But since it has been pretended by writers of the same complexion with this so very forward Reprover, that they have a different object of worship from the Socinians with whom they can by no means

means join, with a good conscience, in the same communion; let this Reprover shew that he has any one different idea concerning God as the supreme object of worship, which a Socinian has not, or for shame, let him drop this plea, as being scandalous in himself, and those who use it without the least foundation, and when they have nothing else to say. I cannot see where this Reprover differs from the Socinians as to the object of his worship. If there can be any difference, it can be only in the manner of it; in the absurdity of his pretending to worship the one God, thro' the mediation of himself; and supposing the person, or intelligent being mediating, to be the same with the person offended; or that the person mediating, is not really a person, an intelligent being or agent, but a metaphysical nature, or abstract idea only.

Secondly, The Reprover must, I suppose, agree with the Socinians in denying, that the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, are distinct intelligent agents, or self-conscious minds; which is what they have always declared to be their meaning, when they deny them to be three distinct persons. This is the only Trinity which a Socinian denies; and herein the Reprover is, I imagine, as much an unitarian, or antitrinitarian, as any Socinian in the world. And as for any incomprehensible differences or distinctions in the one individual supreme being, call them personal, or what you please, the Socinians never affirmed or denied any thing

thing about it. It is a well known fact, that the Socinians have always declared, that the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, are but one God; they have, I own, commonly supposed the Word to be the essential wisdom, and the Spirit to be the essential power, or energy of God; and hereupon they have denied them to be distinct persons, that is, distinct intelligent beings or agents. The notion of the generation and procession of the Son and Holy Ghost from eternity, or before all time, either by a voluntary or necessary act, has been always thought of the last importance to keep up any idea of distinct persons; and therefore this is what the Socinians have always strenuously denied: and since the Reprover has fallen in with them in their fundamental principle, and hath granted them their whole scheme, he may perhaps like them so well at last as to prevail with those religious mountebanks, his superiors, to admit them into their delicious society.

Thirdly, The Reprover's hypothesis of a tri-une subsistence in the Deity supposes that Christ's human soul was not the Word himself incarnate, or made flesh, but another intelligent being, distinct from the Word; he must allow, with the Socinians, that the human person, born of the virgin, the true body and reasonable soul, or the man Christ Jesus, is a distinct intelligent being from the supreme God. Nothing can be more trifling and absurd, than to say here, that

said

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though the natures are distinct, yet the person is the same, unless the Reprover could shew, that distinct intelligent natures must not be distinct intelligent beings, persons, or agents. But I hope, he will not in this place talk of mere logical entities, or of metaphysical abstract natures and ideas, but of things really and actually existing without us; and yet this empty sound of words is the only difference he can pretend to keep with the Socinians.

To say that a human soul is the same intelligent being or agent with the supreme God, or that the supreme God is the same intelligent conscious personal self with an human soul, is not only blasphemy, but the most palpable absurdity and contradiction. I would not be thought hereby to suggest that this is what the Reprover must mean by the hypostatical union as it stands in the scheme of a tri-une subsistence in the Deity, for I have the charity to think he can mean nothing at all by it. But does it not from hence appear, how egregiously divines may distract and inflame the minds of sincere and well-meaning people, by the mere magic of words? And as it is possible by the mechanism of sounds, to teach even a monkey either to fight or to dance, and to express his good or ill liking at pleasure: So I am sorry I must speak out a plain truth, and tell the world, here is a master in Israel, a zealous champion for the orthodoxy of sounds, who yet, I have proved, is not able, upon his own

principles, to clear himself from what he esteems the vilest of all detestable heresies.

When he shall be able to shew, that his verbal orthodoxy differs in any thing that is intelligible from real Socinianism (himself being judge) I shall confess he has said something to the purpose, and own he is no Socinian, but an orthodox scriptural Trinitarian. All that the Socinians say, is, that the supreme God and a human soul cannot be the same intelligent being, agent, or person; and therefore, that they cannot, with either truth or consistency, be joined together under one common name, as if they were the same I, the same He, or the same intelligent agent or personal self. And indeed, Sir, I must say, that I think it is very hard that men must be damned, only because they speak common sense, and do not chime in with this petulant Reprover's nonsense, and renounce the very first principles of reason and religion. It is very well if he shall be able to maintain the credit of being still in the right with the saints, after he has plainly yielded up the cause to those sinners the Socinians; for I can scarce imagine that all his confidence will be sufficient to screen him from the imputation of heresy, with pious visionaries of his own so very delicate complexion, who think their own understandings and judgments to be the universal standard of Christianity, and the rule and measure of eternal life and death. And when once the people shall come to see that he can differ in no
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thing from a Socinian herein, but only in the absurdity of calling two intelligent beings one agent, or two persons one person : they will then, I am afraid, begin to think that he has carried his regard for his absent friends, as well as his resentment against the Blacksmith, a little too far, and that he had much better been silent in this controversy, unless he had been as able, as he seems willing, to defend the cause of bigotry and enthusiasm, against the plain dictates of reason, religion, and common sense. I am,

S I R,

Your most obedient humble servant,

G. J. J. B. D. D. O. P. S. M. B. D. J. C.

F I N I S.

thing from a Socinian heretic, but only in the
day of calling two intelligent persons agent or two
persons one person: they will then, I am afraid, be
ain to think that he has carried his regard for his
true friends, as well as his resentment against the black-
smith, a little too far, and that he had much better
been silent in this controversy, unless he had been as
able, as he seems willing, to defend the cause of his
godly and catholicism, with the plain dictates of rea-
son, religion, and common sense. I am,

Yours

Your most obedient humble servant

C. J. D. D. O. R. M. B. D. J. C.

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